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Case No. 18218

Brief of Defendant-Appellant

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff (Respondents) to recover
allegedly delinquent payments on a contract for the purchase of certain property and seeking a forclosure on that property.

Defendant (Appellant) also

filed a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff because of breaches in the contract
by the Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the time the case was set for trial, the parties entered into
a Stipulation on the record, wherein each of the parties was to perfonn certain acts.
Pro Se.

Plaintiff was represented by Counsel, and Defendant was acting
Counsel for Plaintiff thereafter presented a written Stipulation

to the Court (Record 141-145) but the Defendant did not agree that the written
Stipulation accurately set forth the verbal Stipulation to which he had agreed
and he sent a lett'er to Judge Palmer (R. 140) in which he set forth those
ob.iections.
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-2Thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendant both defaulted in a portion
of the Stipulation, but Plaintiff's Counsel submitted an Affidavit (R. 162)
representing that Defendant had defaulted and the court thereafter entered
Judgment in favor of Plaintiff based upon the Affidavit. ·The Court subsequently denied Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
In this appeal the Defendant-Appellant asks this Court to detennine
that the District Court erred in granting Judgment against him based upon
the Stipulation made by the parties, and also asks the Court to determine
that Defendant has a right to appeal the Order signed by Judge Palmer on
October 8, 1981 in which the written Stipulation was accepted by the Court,
to determine that the Lower Court erred by entering said Order and said Judgment, and that this case be sent back to the District Court for a trial upon
the merits of the case as to each of the parties.
STATNVJENT OF FACTS
For purposes of reference in this Brief, references to the Record
will be referred to by an "R" preceeding the page number of the Record.
There are transcripts of three (3) separate days hearings, and for reference
purposes, any reference to the transcript for September 9, 1981 will be referred to as "Tl" - any references to the transcript for January 28, 1982
will be referred to as "T2", - and any references to the transcript for February 11, 1982 will be referred to as "T3''.
On or about June 27, 1979, the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, entered
into an agreement to purchase .the stock in Naylor-Gross, Inc. , which is a
Utah Corporation, which it was represented owned the Old Rock Mill Fann,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-3together with substantial personal property located thereon. The Old Rock Mill
Farm is real property located in Fannington, Utah, on which there is presently
a restaurant known as the "Heidelberg" restaurant, and other related facilities.
At the time of purchase, the corporation· was ·having substantial
financial difficulties and liabilities which had been represented to Mr.
Backman to be approximately $110,000.

Because of the financial difficulties

at that time, the contract for the Defendant to purchase provided for a total
price of $440, 000. 00, but did not · require Mr. · Backmm ·to pay any amounts
of cash directly to the sellers, as stated in the contract (Rf ~7) as follows:
11

A.

$110, 000. 00, which shall be paid toward the Sellers
debts which have been accrued by the Naylor Gross,
Inc. Buyer and Seller will arrange for the method
and time of payment to debtors.

B.

$3,000.00 per month beginning March 20, 1979, until
balance is paid in full, including interest.
·

C.

Sellers agree to release upper north 4 acres to Buyer,
free and clear, upon receipt of $10,000.00 from buyer
at any time during contract. Sellers agree to pay
expenses of Corporation liquidation of Naylor Gross,
Inc.
·

D.

Buyer agrees to assume the present existing SBA obligation of approximately $70,000.00.

E.

It is understood that this agreement is subordinate
to the terms and provisions of a forthcoming final
agreement which shall ~e written by the attorneys
representing the buyer and seller and approved by all
parties concerned. 11

-·

At the time of entering into the Agreement, it is questionable
whether either party was represented by Counsel, because the Agreement was
entered into by Naylor Gross, Inc . , and purported to sell itself.

Also,

the agreement was prepared on a Standard Uniform Real Estate Contract Form,
even though it did not include the legal description of any property.
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Never-

-4thel es s, it is, counsel for Defendant believes, substantially ·agreed that
it was intended to sell the Stock of Naylor Gross, Inc., which had been represented owned the property on which the Heidelberg restaurant and related
facilities sits, together with substantial personal property necessary to
operate those facilities.
Defendant took possession of the facilities, and there were then
disputes that arose between the parties.

As a result of those disputes,

the Plaintiffs filed suit in the Second Judicial Districrt Court on December
1, 1980.

In that Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant was delin-

quent in his payments to them personally and to the Small Blsiness Administration, and they asked for a Judgment thereon, a return of the property, and
a declaration that the Trust Deed on the property should be returned to them.
Defendant answered and filed a Counterclaim in which he alleged
that he was not delinquent in the payments and by way of Counterclaim alleged
as follows:
1.

The Plaintiff had removed substantial amounts of personal pro-

perty from the premesis which belonged to the Corporation, although he did
not know the number of items or the value of those items at the time.
2.

He had determined that the real property was not in the name

of the Corporation as had been represented, so that his present contract
really gave him nothing except a hollow shell, and the Plaintiffs were refusing to transfer the property into the name of the Corporation.

3.

The Corporation liabilities were substantially larger than

had been disclosed at the time of purchase by him, and since he had purchased
the corporate stock those liabilities caused a substantial difference in
the value of the corporate stock which had not been disclosed to him.
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Although Defendant was to assume the obligation to the Small

Business Administration, the Plaintiffs had sold or removed some of the real

and personal property which had been pledged as collateral to the Small Business Administration, and therefore he could not assume an .. obligation where
collateral had been pledged where that collateral no longer belonged to the
Corporation.

5.

The Plaintiffs had failed to clear the existing bills and obli-

gations of the Corporation as they had promised to do.

6.

The Plaintiffs had failed to pay the property taxes through

the time period when they were committed to pay said property taxes.

7.

That Plaintiffs had failed to give Defendants c·redit for numer-

ous payments which he had made to the Creditors of the Plaintiff.
Substantial discovery went on and there were other matters that
proceeded, but the case was set for trial on September 9, 1981 before the
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer.

At the appointed time, Plaintiff's and their

counsel met with Defendant and Judge Palmer in Judge Palmer's chambers.
Certain discussions were carried on regarding the possibilities of settlement
both in the presence of Judge Palmer and some additional discussions out
of the presence of Judge Palmer.

The portion which were carried on in the

presence of Judge Palmer were not recorded, but at the conclusion of those
discussions, the parties had come to an agreement and they met in Judge
Palmers chambers and entered a Stipulation into the record.
is contained in Tl-1 to 19.

That Stipulation

One of the first and most important provisions

of that Stipulation was stated at Tl-2, wherein it was stated:
The Defendant will pay, or fully assume so as to
relieve plaintiff from all liabilities, outstanding
-- let's see, -accounts payable that were outstanding
against the plaintiff as of March l, 1979, in the sum
of $110,000, plus any interest that has accrued on
said
amount.
The plaintiff
will,
the same
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-6defendant of all liability, all other accounts payable
that existed as of March 1, 1979. The parties will
work out, well, the parties will further stipulate
and work out between themselves which bills, which
accounts payable will be so satisfied or fully assurned
by which the parties -- does that makE? sense?"
There is no part of that transcript wherein the Defendant agrees, or even
discusses, what penalties would be imposed if either the Defendant or the
Plaintiff failed to abide by the provisions contained in that stipulation.
There had been previous discussions relating to which liabilities
would be assumed by the Plaintiff, but those matters were in fact stated
in writing by counsel for Plaintiffs in a letter directed to the Defendant
on November 2, 1981 (Rl69-l72) , and the relevant portions ~ of that .letter
are contained at R.171 wherein it is stated as follows:
"You are hereby notified that Plaintiffs shall pay or
fully assume that arnount of obligations within the ti~e
provided in the Stipulation as follows:
1.

Since almost from the first week after the settlement
there was verbal agreement between Plaintiffs and
yourself that the tax amount attributable to.Line 26
and verified to be $8,325.60 would be a logical item
for Plaintiffs to take responsibility for, Plaintiffs
will pay or fully assume so as to release you from
any liability that amount together with all accrued
interest and penalties attributable to that amount
since March l, 1979."

Following entry of the Stipulation in Court, Counsel for Plaintiff
submitted a proposed Order to the Court for its signature (R.141-142) and
it had attached thereto Exhibit A, which was his interpretation of the Stipulation (R.143-145).
146-150).

Another copy of the same document is contained at (R.

That document was submitted to Mr. Backman for his approval as

to fonn, and he immediately ordered a copy of the transcript because it did
not seem correct to him, and he notified Judge Palmer that he did not agree
with the written stipulation, and his objection was sent by way of a letter
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-7dated September 22, 1981 which may be found at (R.140).
The pertinent part of the Order provided as follows:
''If the Defendant, Thoma.s K. Backman, does not fulfill
all of the terms and conditions relating to Defendant
set forth in Exhibit "A" within the time provided therein,
and if Plaintiffs have fulfilled all the tenns and conditions relating to Plaintiffs, Judgment shall be entered
in favor of Plaintiffs, Naylor-Gross, Inc., Garth L. Naylor
and Terry Gross and against, Defendant, Thomas K. Backman . .

II

The Order was apparantly resubmitted as contained at (R.146-147),
and was apparantly signed by Judge Palmer on October 8, 1981.
Defendant believed that this was an appealable Order and called
the District Court clerks office on November 4, 1981 to determine the date
on which the Judge signed the Stipulation and Order so as to determine his
deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal.

After searching the file, the em-

ployee of the Clerk's office infonned Defendant that the Order was not signed
and had been filed with a note "Ordered to be filed unsigned 10-23-81 by
J. Duffy Palmer, Judge." (see R. 155).

The employee in the clerks office

had a second employee confinn that, so that Defendant was given that statement
by two (2) separate employees in the Clerks office, and was also told that
his Notice of Appeal would not be accepted because there was no existing
Order to be appealed.
Even though Defendant believed that the Order and Stipulation had
not been signed or approved, he ma.de the $6,000.00 payment required by said
Stipulation on September 9, 1981, and paid the other $3, 000. 00 on November
I

9, 1981 to show his good faith in complying with the agreement he had entered
into in Court.
Thereafter,

on December 23, 1981, counsel for Plaintiffs filed

an Affidavit in Court (R. 162-166) in which he indicated that the Defendant
had not complied with the terms of the Stipulation and Order, and based upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8that Affidavit a Judgment was entered by the court (R.182-185) without further
consultation or notice to Defendant.

This was done notwithstanding the fact

that Plaintiffs had not paid or "fully assumed so as to relieve Defendant
of all liability" of the obligation to the Utah State Tax Commission in an
amount of $$,325.60 as they had agreed to do, thereby placing them in breach
of the Stipulation.
It is from that Judgment, and from the entry of the Order approving
the Stipulation that this appeal is taken.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT BECAUSE THEY
DID NOT HAVE "CLEAN HANDS" BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT COMPLIED
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE STIPULATION A1'IT) ORDER OF YHE

COURT.

When the parties were before Judge Pallner and entered into a verbal
Stipulation on the record, it was agreed that the Defendant would assume
existing liabilities in the sum of $110, 000. 00 and that Plaintiff would "pay
or fully assume, so as to relieve Defendant of all liability, all other
accounts payable that existed as of March l, 1979. ''

(Tl-3 ) (emphasis added) .

The parties later agreed that one of the liabilities which Plaintiff would
pay or assume so as to relieve Defendant from all liability from was an existing obligation to the Utah State Tax Corrnnission for state sales tax in an
amount of $$,325.60.
Defendant does challenge herein the correctness of signing the
Order and Stipulation submitted to the court by Plaintiffs counsel, but assuming arguendo for purposes of this point, that the Order was correct, that
Order provided as follows:
"If the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, does not fulfill
all of the terms and conditions reltaing to Defendant set
forth in Exhibit 'A I within the time vvw; ~°'~ +- i._,.._,....,.._..;
~--1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
Technology Act, all
administered
by the Utah State
if Plaintiffs
haveandfulfilled
of thC<-~· Library.
V\

c-C

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

--

- - .... · · - -

-9tions relating to Plaintiffs, Judgment shall be entered
in favor of Plaintiffs, Naylor Gross, Inc., Garth L. Naylor
and Terry Gross, and against Defendant, Thorras K. Backman."
(emphasis added)
When counsel for Plaintiff submitted his Affidavit and proposed
Judgment to the Court and represented that Defendant had not complied with
the Stipulation, he did so without any notice to Defendant and he attempted
to show ihc3.t he had .complied with the Stipulation by submitting to the Court
certain. documents, including a statement from the State Tax Corrmission and
an Assistant Attorney General to show that the amount of taxes due was

$8,325.60 and to further indicate that Mr. Backman had not fonnally assumed
any of the sales and withholding tax liabilities of Naylor Gross, Inc.

How-

ever, that did not carry Plaintiffs burden of proof to show that Plaintiff
had fulfilled- all of the terms and conditions of the Stipulation, and in
fact, Plaintiff had not complied with the provisions of the Stipulation as
it related to paying or assuming the tax obligation so as to relieve Defendant
from liability thereon.
The liability to the Utah State Tax Commission was in the name
of Naylor Gross, Inc.

The property which Defendant had purportedly purchased

was the stock in Naylor Gross, Inc.

Therefore, the only way that Plaintiffs

could have complied with the Stipulation so far as it related to the State
Tax Commission, was to either pay the obligation or to obtain a release from
the State Tax Commission in which it agreed not to look to either the Defendant or Naylor Gross, Inc. for those taxes.

The record is clear that the

Plaintiffs did not do· either of those, and they therefore have not fulfilled
the terms of the Stipulation.
However, Plaintiffs have argued in the District Court that this
should not.prevent them from taking Judgment because the Defendant has taken
+"ha
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-10for the obligation.

Nevertheless, it is submitted that Defendant is entitled

to take that position with the State Tax Comrrdssion, and that is not dispositive of the issues in this case.

The issues in each case are different.

In fact, this is not inconsistant with the position taken in this case, because he may take the position before the Tax Commission that he is not personally liable for those obligations, but maintain that it is a corporate
obligation of the corporation for which he purchased the stock.

Therefore,

even if he were not held responsible for those taxes before the Tax Commission
on the basis that it is a corporate obligation, the Plaintiffs still would
not have fulfilled their responsibility because the corporation which the
Defendant would then own would in fact be responsible for those taxes, and
it would ultimately reduce his value or net worth in the corporation, and
wo:uld therefore> be coming directly out of his pocket as far as any accounting
with the Plaintiffs is concerned.
However, notwithstanding any position taken by the Defendant with
the Tax Commission, there is a statute which makes him liable for those taxes
based upon certain premesis, which is Section 59-15-10, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, which provides as follows:
"The tax imposed by this act shall be a lien upon the.proper:ty of any wholesaler or retailer or proprietor who shall
~_ell out his business or stock of goods or shall quit business and such person shall be required to make out tne
return provided for under Section 59-15-5, within thirty
(30) days after the date he sold out his business or stock
of goods or quit business and his successor in business
shall be required to withhold slifTicient of' the purchase
money to cover the amount of' said taxes due and unpaid
until such time as the former owner shall prOduce a receipt
from the Tax Corrnnission showing that the taxes have been
paid, or a certificate that no taxes are due. If the purchaser of a business or stock of goods shall fail to withhold the purchase money as above provided and the taxes
shall be due and unpaid after the thirty (30) day period
allowed, he shall be personally liable for the payment of
the taxes collected and unpaid by the former owner."
(Emphasis
Sponsored
by the S.J. added)
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It is clear from the record, that the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, purchased
the business from the Plaintiffs on or about March 1, 1979, and that there
were delinquent sales and use truces which constituted Judgments against the
property in an amount, including all penalties and interest, of nearly $9,000,
and it is equally clear that the Defendant failed to withhold from the purchase money sufficient amounts to pay the truces due and unpaid, and that
those amounts were not paid within thirty (30) days thereafter, and in fact
have still not been paid.

Based. upon that situation, it is clear that the

statute makes the Defendant personally liable for the payment of those truces.
Therefore, it is clear that the only way that Plaintiffs could
comply with the Stipulation which they entered into in Court is to either
pay to the True Commission the amount of truces that were due at the time the
business was ptirchased, or in the alternative, to obtain a release from the
Utah State True Commission.
It is submitted that the Plaintiffs did not perfonn either one of
those steps, and certainly have not provided the Court with any evidence
that such steps have in fact been taken, and until such steps are taken,
the PJ.aihtiff_s are_ ID breach of the Stipulation entered into before Judge Palmer
even assuming arguendo that the Defendant did in fact breach that agreement.
Therefore, where the Plaintiffs have breached the Stipulation, they
do not have "clean hands" and cannot ask the Court to enforce the Stipulation
against the Defendant while they are personally in default and in breach
of the Stipulation they entered into and therefore do not have clean hands.
Therefore,

it is respectfully submitted that the District Court

erred in granting Judgment to Plaintiffs, and the Court· should reverse that
Judgment and send the case back for a trial upon its merits.
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POINT II
NO NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO DEFENDANT THAT A JUDGMENT WAS GOING
'ID BE REQUESTED, AND COPIES OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND JUIX1MENT
WERE NOT SERVED UPON DEFENDANT UNTIL AFTER THE JUDGMENT
HAD BEEN EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COUR'I'.
Assuming arguendo, for purposes of this Brief, that the Judge had
correctly entered the Order and Stipulation dated October 8, 1981, the Judgment was still entered improperly and incorrectly against the Defendant.
The Judgment was entered by presenting to Judge Palmer an Affidavit
and proP<?sed Judgment from the Plaintiff.

No copy of that Affidavit or pro-·

posed Judgment was ever served upon the Plaintiff prior to the

it was

tlir~

executed and entered by the Court, and it was therefore handled as an ex
parte proceeding.
It is submitted that it should have been handled as a Motion for
a Judgment with the Affidavit, with the Defendant to have an opportunity
to respond to the Motion and any facts alleged in the Affidavit.

Rule 6d,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
"A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex
parte, and Notice of the hearing thereof, shall be served
not later than five (5) days before the time specified for
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these
rules or by order of the Court. Such an Order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a Motion
is supported by Affidavit, the Affidavit shall be served
with the Motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule
59(c), opposing Affidavits may be served not later than
one (1) day before the hearing, unless the Court permits
them to be served at some other time period." (Emphasis added)
There is no reason at all why the Judgment should not have been
applied for by way of Motion instead of ex parte, and there is no

reason

at all why Defendant should not have been served a copy of the Motion and
Affidavit, nor is there any reason why he should not have had an opportunity
to respond with an opposing Affidavit.

Instead of following Rule 6(d) of
~..:

ni
_._..: "'"' ---- ____, _
the Sponsored
Utah by. Rules
of Law
Civil
Procedure,
the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitizationcounsel
provided by thefo~
Institute of Museum and Library Services

ex parte basis.

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

-13Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that counsel for Plaintiff
and the Court failed to properly adhere to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the Judgment which was improperly entered should be reversed and the
case should.be sent. back for a trial upon its merits.
POINT III
THE GRANTING OF A JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE AND ~JITHOUT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND RESPOND CONSTITUTES A DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS TO THE DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
ALSO PURSUANT TO SECTION 7, ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
The relevant portions of Section 1 of the Fomyeenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:!.
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or pr?perty, without due process of law; ''
In addition, Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Utah
provcides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."
·
·
It clearly cannot be denied that the Judgment entered by the Court
in this case deprives the Defendant of property.

The Defendant had entered

into an agreement to purchase the business for a sum of $440,000, and the
record reflects that the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, as of the time of
the Judgment, had made substantial payments thereon, including the payment
of $90, 000. 00 of the required $110, 000. 00 liabilities to be assumed, payment
of $31,000.00 on the Small Business Administration loan, payment of $54,000.00
in monthly payments, and had made improvements of $25 ,000.00, for a total
amount as of the time of the Judgment which he had paid in excess of $200,000
It is represented that additional payments have been rrede since that time.
Therefore, the Defendant has clearly been deprived of substantial property
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Judgment.

-14The only question theri is whether Defendant was granted due process
of law by the manner in which the Judgment was entered.
As has been stated above, the Judgment was entered without any
Notice of any type being given to Defendant, and without any opportunity
to submit an opposing Affidavit to indicate to the Court that the Plaintiffs
had not complied with the relevant portions of the Stipulation.

In addition,

the Judgment was granted without said matter being presented to the Court
by way of a Motion as would ·no:rrnctlly be required by Rule 6 (d) , Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The Defendant, in the Stipulation entered into before the Court,
did not .;_ agree that any Judgment could be granted i f there was non-compliance
with the Stipulation, and_ especially did not provide that the Judgment could
be granted without any Notice or hearing permitted to him.

In addition,

the Order which was entered by the Judge approving the Stipulation and stateing that Judgment would be granted, did not state that Judgment would be
entered without Notice to the Defendant.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that when a Judgment was
taken against the Defendant without any notice being given to him and without
any opportunity to respond and present an opposing Affidavit to the Court,

•

that Defendant has been deprived of property without due process of law,
and that this violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
and this case should be sent back to the Court for a trial upon its merits.
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-15POINT IV
THERE WERE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH WERE NOT YET RESOLVED, AND
'I'HE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED JUDGMENT WHILE SUCH ISSUES
OF FACT WERE AS YET UNDETERMINED.
The Judgment entered by the court was presented in a manner which
is not specifically provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
theless, it was

Never-

procedurally very s:irhilar to a Motion for Summary Judgment ·

which is provided for by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

A

portion of Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
"The Judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
Pleadings, Depositions, Answers to Interrogatories, and
Admissions of file, together with the Affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a Judgment
as a matter of law. 11 (emphasis added)
It is submitted that there were still issues of fact to be determined in this case.

Specifically, i f the Court had given Defendant an opportun-

ity to present an opposing Affidavit, Defendant would have presented an
Affidavit showing that Plaintiffs had not complied with all of the requirements of the Stipulation, and therefore would not have been entitled to the
Judgment.

Instead, Defendant was denied that right.
Nevertheless, there were issues of fact which should have been

resolved by the District Court before entering a Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and it is respectfully submitted that the case should be sent back
to the District Cburt for a trial upon the merits of the case.
POINT V
THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE COURT ON OCTOBER S, 19Sl, WHICH
APPROVED THE WRITTEN STIPULATION AS STATED BY PLAINTIFFS
COIB'JSEL, BUT NOT SIGNED BY DEFENDANT, WENT BEYOND THE
AGREE1v1ENT OF THE PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED
BY THE COURT.
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-16On September 9, 1981, the parties met at the time the case was
set for trial, and numerous discussions were held in the presence of the
Court to begin with, following which there were numerous and lengthy discussions held out of the presence of the Court, and following that the parties
re-entered the Court's presence and placed a verbal stipulation upon the
record before the Judge and the Court Reporter.
Prior to that Stipulation being entered upon the record, it is
obvious from the file that each of the parties believed they had good and
valid points to present to the Court at the time of trial.
Nevertheless, in an effort to attempt to settle the case, it is
")1

obvious that each of the parties had made certain concessions to reach the
Stipulation which was entered upon the Court record before Judge Palmer and
it must also be remembered that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney,
whereas Defendant was acting pro se and was not represented by an attorney.
At the conclusion of the discussions, the verbal stipulation was
entered on the Court record and is fully disclosed in the document herein
referred to as Tl, which is the Reporters transcript of the proceedings for
Wednesday, September 9, 1981.

A full reading of that transcript will not.

disclose any agreement by the Defendant to have Judgment entered in the event
that either he or Plaintiff was not able to fully comply with the provisions
of that Stipulation.
At the time theDefendants Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order
was argued before the Court, there were comments made by Judge Palmer that
would indicate he felt earlier discussions, which were not on the record,
had discussed the possibilty of Judgment being entered against Defendant,
and there were also statements which would indicate that any Stipulation
would have to have some provision for Judgment if it was not complied with.
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-17Notwithstanding those comments by Judge Palmer, it is clear that
Judge Palmer was not present during the entire discussions which led up to
that Stipulation.

Judge Palmer did not know what concessions had been made

by each of the parties, nor did he know the significance of each of those
concessions made by each of the parties.

Further, it is just as obvious

that if there needed to be a provision to allow for Judgment if Defendant
did not comply with the Stipulation, it is just as obvious that there should
have been a similar type of provision for Judgment if Defendant fully complied
with the Stipulation but Plaintiff did not comply with his portion of the
Stipulation:

Where is any such a statement contained in the Exhibit "A"

attached to the Order which was drafted by Plaintiffs counsel?
in fact, obvious that

Judgrr~nt

If it is,

would need to be granted, why did Plaintiffs

attorney not put in a recipricol provision in case Plaintiff failed to comply,
but Defendant fully complied?
It is submitted that the Order and Stipulation were drafted by
Plaintiff, the party which was represented by counsel at the proceeding,
and that Plaintiffs counsel attempted to take advantage of Defendant because
he was not represented by counsel and to come through the Stipulation with
the clear advantage and benefit.
It is respectfully submitted that when the parties were negotiating
that there was "give and take" by each of the parties and that there were
certain concessions made by each of the parties.

Judge Palmer, in signing

the Order dated October 8, 1981, presumed that all of the give and take was
by Defendant, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to have every questionable
item construed in their favor.

However, such is not the case, and Defendant

is entitled to have the Stipulation which he made and entered into interpreted
within the walls of that Stipulation as it was placed on the record.
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placed

-18on the record, were not part of the Stipulation actually entered into, and
were merely preliminary discussions in attempting to see if a basis for agreement could be reached.
In addition, since Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and since
it was Plaintiffs counsel who stated the initial Stipulation on the record,
it is submitted that any shortcoming in that Stipulation should be construed
against the parties so represented by counsel and in favor of the party not
represented by counsel.

If a Judgment was desired if there was no compliance

with the Stipulation, then such procedural problems should have been covered
by the party represented by counsel, and cannot be const\lled against the
party not represented by counsel.
In summary, it is respectfully submitted that the Order dated October 8, 19Sl, was improperly entered by the Court and it exceeded. the Stipulation which had been entered into by the Defendant, and the Defendant rray
well not have entered into the Stipulation if a provision for Judgment had
been requested in his presence while the Stipulation was actually being placed
on the record.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Plaintiff does not have clean hands because they
did not comply with the provisions of the Stipulation relating to them, and
they are therefore not entitled to hold the Defendant strictly to the provisions of the Stipulation while they are also in non-compliance.

Further,

if the Plaintiffs intended to ask the Court for a Judgment for any alleged
non-compliance by the Defendant, they should have given the Defendant Notice
of their intention to make such a request, they should have made a formal
Motion in compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and they should
have given the Defendant an opportunity to present

Affidavit
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111!
--19to present the Defendant's side of the story.

The failure by Plaintiff to

give such notice and opportunities to the Defendant is a clear violation
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is a clear denial of the constitutional rights of the Defendant as provided by the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Utah.

Further, the Order and written Stipulation

upon which the Judgment was based was clearly improperly entered.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should
reverse the decision of the District Court and should return it to the District Court for a trial upon its merits.
DATED this 9z{day of July, 1982.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS

~~~
G. Blaine Davis
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